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Can the EU Presidency make its
mark on interstate bargains?
The Italian and Irish Presidencies
of the 2003–04 IGC
Ben Crum
ABSTRACT According to liberal intergovernmentalism the outcome of EU
negotiations is determined by the constellation of member state interests without
needing any formal leadership. This article reviews this ‘self-clearing thesis’ in the
context of the 2003–04 IGC. It further examines what impact the European
Convention, which prepared a comprehensive draft Constitutional Treaty, has
had on these negotiations. Three roles of the Italian and the Irish Presidency
leading the 2003–04 IGC are analysed: managing the scope of the negotiations’
agenda, brokering efficient deals and promoting specific interests. Little evidence
is found that the Presidencies really made a substantial difference in brokering
the eventual deals or in promoting their own interests. However, the presence of
the Convention’s draft allowed the Presidencies to adopt an agenda management
strategy that changed the nature of the negotiations and the power configuration
of interests and thus radically departed from those normally applying at IGCs.
KEY WORDS EU Constitutional Treaty; EU Presidency; Intergovernmental
Conference; liberal intergovernmentalism; negotiation theory.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the agreement between the European Union (EU)
member governments on the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’
and, in particular, whether the Italian and Irish Presidencies leading the
2003–04 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) have in any way made a sub-
stantial difference to this agreement. The theoretical backdrop of this examin-
ation is what I propose to call the ‘self-clearing thesis’, which is a core
component of Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ theory of
European integration (Moravcsik 1998, 1999; Moravcsik and Nicolaı¨dis
1999). According to Moravcsik (1999: 298), ‘[d]ecentralized bargaining is
“naturally” efficient’. In his view ‘demand for cooperation tends to create its
own supply. Institutions, procedures, and norms, as well as entrepreneurs are
not required’ (Moravcsik 1999: 301). Under these conditions, the role of
actors who can claim a distinctive position in the negotiation process – the
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Commission but, by implication, also the EU Presidency – is at most that of
a ‘midwife’, ensuring that the ‘outcome foretold’ is delivered as speedily and
efficiently as possible; they are, however, unlikely to leave their ‘parental’
mark on the substance of the outcome.
The self-clearing thesis is by no means uncontested. Recent years have wit-
nessed a growing number of studies of the role of the EU Presidency in steering
EU negotiations. Most notably, Jonas Tallberg has argued that the French Pre-
sidency successfully protected its own interests in the course of the 2000 IGC.
He concludes: ‘despite negotiation conditions that worked against the capacity
of the Presidency to engineer agreement and shape distributional outcomes, the
French government managed to strike an accord that simultaneously secured
key national interests’ (Tallberg 2006b: 36). This position challenges the self-
clearing thesis in two regards. It suggests, first, that entrepreneurship by the
EU Presidency is essential in brokering efficient bargaining outcomes and,
second, that the Presidency can promote its own interests by steering the distri-
butive effects of the outcomes.
Beyond brokering efficient outcomes and appropriating distributive gains,
the 2003–04 IGC highlights a third role for the Presidency, namely the man-
agement of the scope of the negotiations. Notably, the 2003–04 IGC was dis-
tinctive compared to earlier IGCs because it was preceded by a Convention that
prepared a complete legal text for the IGC and ensured that its agenda was
already extensively visited. While previous IGCs had been preceded by prep-
aration groups to survey the issues involved, these never presented complete
legal texts ready to be adopted by the member states. As a consequence, it
became an important task for the Presidency to define the status of the Conven-
tion’s draft in the IGC and to determine the scope of the issues open for
(re-)negotiation.
The article thus pursues two questions: Does the 2003–04 IGC confirm the
self-clearing thesis or have the Italian and Irish Presidencies made a difference?
And what has been the impact of the European Convention and its draft Con-
stitutional Treaty on the negotiations? The next section reviews the underpin-
nings of the self-clearing thesis in the liberal intergovernmentalist account of
inter-state bargaining, contrasting it with recent accounts that have highlighted
the procedural powers of the EU Presidency. The subsequent empirical analysis
of the 2003–04 IGC is then organized around the three roles of the Presidency
in managing the negotiations’ agenda, brokering deals acceptable to all and pro-
moting (self-)interests.
1. INTER-STATE BARGAINING AND THE ROLE OF THE
EU PRESIDENCY
Andrew Moravcsik’s self-clearing account of inter-state bargaining is part of his
liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration (Moravcsik
1998, 1999; Moravcsik and Nicolaı¨dis 1999). According to this account the
(efficient) outcome of EU negotiations follows logically from the given
B. Crum: Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC 1209
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preferences of the negotiating state actors: ‘[d]ecentralized bargaining is
“naturally” efficient’ (Moravcsik 1999: 298). Crucial to this self-clearing
theory of inter-state bargaining is the claim that negotiation parties face few
impediments in identifying mutual gains as information is relatively cheap. Cer-
tainly in the context of EU negotiations, ‘information and ideas are widely and
evenly distributed’ among the actors involved (Moravcsik 1998: 55; cf. 1999:
301). What is more, if certain relevant pieces of information are less readily
available, actors who take a particular interest in a successful outcome of the
negotiations will be willing to make the effort to disclose them: ‘The most inter-
ested national governments and societal groups can act as effective policy entre-
preneurs’ (Moravcsik 1998: 55, 480).
The self-clearing thesis thus suggests that the outcome of international nego-
tiations is fully determined by the given constellation of state interests. Efficiency
is secured because all agreements that are mutually advantageous will be ident-
ified. Furthermore, in this account also the distribution of the benefits is fully
determined as it suggests that, with all states possessing the right of veto, the
number of concessions that states are able to extort from each other is propor-
tionate to the extent to which they are willing to acquiesce in the existing
situation (Moravcsik 1998: 62). Hence, the successful conclusion of the nego-
tiations does not require formal leaders, actors vested with a particular role or
powers that allow them to drive the negotiation process forward where otherwise
the negotiation parties would risk getting stalled or subscribing to sub-optimal
solutions. Most pointedly, with regard to the role of the European Commission,
Moravcsik (1999: 269–70) submits: ‘supranational intervention, far from being
a necessary condition for efficient interstate negotiation in the EC [European
Community], is generally late, redundant, futile, and sometimes even
counterproductive.’
While Moravcsik’s analysis is primarily targeted against the distinctive role
attributed to supranational actors like the European Commission in inter-
national negotiations, his analysis has a direct bearing upon the role of the
EU Presidency. While the member state holding the Presidency may develop
into a policy entrepreneur just like any other state taking a distinctive interest
in the negotiations, the role of the Presidency and the responsibilities associated
with it would not attribute this state with distinctive additional powers to steer
the negotiations towards one outcome rather than another. The intergovern-
mentalist argument may grant that the Presidency may tamper with the pro-
cedure. Still, if negotiations are fully transparent, then in principle whatever
efforts the Presidency undertakes are unlikely to unveil any options that could
not have been logically foreseen from the start. In short, even if the process
may vary, the outcome will remain given as it is supposed to be the rational
resultant of the given preferences of the actors involved.
In contrast to the intergovernmentalist’s scepticism, various authors have in
recent years come to analyse the means by, and the conditions under, which the
EU Presidency can drive EU negotiations forward (Tallberg 2006a; Metcalfe
1998; Elgstro¨m 2003; Beach 2005). They have highlighted the specific resources
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of the EU Presidency that distinguish it from the other member states. First, the
claim is that the Presidency has access to information that other states do not
have (Tallberg 2006a: 29f.). Its distinctive role gives the Presidency the credi-
bility to call upon member states to account for their positions and to do so,
if needed, in a bilateral exchange that can be kept confidential. Related to this
is the use the Presidency can make of the Council secretariat that acts as the
Council’s memory as it systematically accumulates inside knowledge of
member state positions while the Presidency rotates (Beach 2005). A second
set of resources is constituted by the Presidency’s procedural controls (Tallberg
2006a: 31). In particular four controls can be identified. First, the Presidency
can steer the procedure by setting its timeframe through the determination of
deadlines for decisions and for intermediate milestones. Then, it determines
the frequency of meetings, at which level they are held and what character
they take. Third, the Presidency is in charge of the agendas of all Council meet-
ings. Finally, the Presidency takes the lead in managing the ‘zone of possible
agreement’ (Raiffa 1982; Metcalfe, 1998: 423), as it is in many cases (apart
from those, mostly legislative, dossiers that are prepared by the Commission)
responsible for the drafting of negotiation texts.
In the literature on negotiations, a distinction is commonly made between
two dimensions along which the Presidency can affect negotiations: their effi-
ciency and their distributional effects. The Presidency can increase the efficiency
of negotiations by identifying solutions that are beneficial to all parties involved.
This is probably best referred to as the (pure) brokerage function of the Presi-
dency. For the analysis below, it is helpful to distinguish further between, on
the one hand, the delineation of the range of issues that are under negotiation
and, on the other hand, the optimizing of the agreement within that range.
In the practice of negotiation, initiatives of these two kinds are often mixed,
most notably when new issues are brought into the negotiations to allow for
pay-offs to those parties that have to make concessions on the initial issues. Ana-
lytically we may, however, separate the task of delineating the agenda of nego-
tiations from the actual brokering of deals within the given range of issues.
Furthermore, beyond serving the general good of brokering outcomes that are
beneficial for all, the Presidency may also use its resources to skew the
outcome towards certain interests rather than others; in particular it may try
to bring about outcomes that are of particular interest to itself. In those cases,
the Presidency thus acts as a promoter of specific interests rather than as a
broker serving the general interest of the negotiations.
The empirical sections below examine whether the 2003–04 IGC confirms
the self-clearing thesis or whether the two Presidencies have made a difference
for each of the three Presidency roles: managing the agenda, brokering a unan-
imous deal and promoting (self-)interests. More specifically, these analyses will
seek to identify whatever discretion the Presidencies enjoyed in exercising these
roles and, having established that, demonstrate whether the Presidencies’ choices
have indeed been consequential for the outcome of the negotiations. The sub-
sidiary research question concerns the impact of the European Convention and
B. Crum: Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC 1211
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its draft Constitutional Treaty on the negotiations. Here it is of particular inter-
est whether the presence of the draft Constitutional Treaty has affected the space
of discretion of the Presidency and thus its ability to steer the negotiations.
Inevitably, addressing these questions involves the invocation of counterfactual
reasoning to consider whether another Presidency would have acted differently
or what would have happened in a ‘normal’ IGC without a preceding Conven-
tion (cf. Fearon 1991).
2. AGENDA MANAGEMENT: DEFINING THE SCOPE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
As pointed out, the 2003–04 IGC differed from its predecessors as it proceeded to
work on the basis of a complete legal text that had been prepared for it by the Euro-
pean Convention. Regardless of the satisfaction of the Conventionels with the
document they had produced, they had no reason to expect it to be simply
accepted by the member governments. The Laeken Declaration which had
defined the Convention’s mandate provided that its ‘final document will
provide a starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference,
which will take the ultimate decisions’ (European Council 2001). In line with
this, when the European Council at Thessaloniki received the work of the Conven-
tion in June 2003, it affirmed: ‘the text of the Draft Constitutional Treaty is a good
basis for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference’ (European Council 2003).
The comprehensive draft of the Convention confronted the Italian Presidency
with two major choices before even opening the negotiations. First, there was the
question whether negotiations would depart from the Treaty of Nice or from the
Convention’s draft. Formally, it was of course the case that as long as the IGC
would not reach a conclusion by unanimity, the status quo established by the
Treaty of Nice would obtain. At the same time, also given the active involvement
of representatives of all Heads of Government, it was clear that much groundwork
had been done in the Convention and that it would be ludicrous to engage with the
negotiations from scratch. In particular the Convention’s draft had the merit of
providing a completely new format that integrated the existing treaties in a well-
structured integral text. Thus, while there emerged a consensus on the format
from which the IGC would depart, some governments (most notably the
Spanish and the Polish) would insist that in terms of substance the negotiations
were to depart from the agreements reached in Nice (cf. Palacio 2003).
The second, related question was to what extent the agenda of the IGC would
again open up everything that had been discussed during the Convention. In
principle, the real negotiations only started at the IGC and, hence, one could
claim that any amendment that the Convention had made to the Treaty of
Nice would need to be revisited. At the same time, there were many interests
in limiting the negotiations. This of course applied to the Presidency itself,
but also most national delegations were keen to limit negotiations to those
issues on which they themselves retained reservations without opening up
additional ones. However, as the reservations of different delegations involved
1212 Journal of European Public Policy
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different kinds of issues, there was a real risk that by opening some, many others
would follow.
The Italian agenda management strategy
The Italian government held outspoken preferences on the two agenda-setting
choices: it sought to establish the Convention’s draft as the basis of the nego-
tiations and to restrain the scope of the issues to be reopened. These preferences
were very much motivated by the Italians’ firm commitment to finish the nego-
tiations within the term of their Presidency, i.e. by December 2003 at the latest.
Prime Minister Berlusconi appeared keen on the prospect of the Constitutional
Treaty becoming the crown on his EU Presidency and being baptized as the
second ‘Treaty of Rome’. This procedural interest was reinforced by the fact
that the Italians were basically quite satisfied with the Convention’s draft as
they saw it meeting their, generally integrationist, preferences.
The Italian government effectively exploited its position in the Presidency to
impose its preferences on the negotiations. For a start, the Italians turned the
conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council into a benchmark by
reading them in a distinctively affirmative way:
The Thessaloniki European Council welcomed the text of the draft Consti-
tutional Treaty drawn up by the Convention and considered it to be a
good basis for starting the IGC. The Presidency is therefore of the firm
view that the IGC should maintain the same level of ambition, especially in
institutional matters, and should aim to depart as little as possible from a
balanced text which is the result of 18 months of intense negotiation.
(Presidency of the European Union 2003: 1; original emphasis)
Thus the Italians put the ‘burden of argument’ firmly on those who wanted to
amend the Convention’s draft. Following a round of consultations, they ident-
ified no more than four crucial issues ‘which cause substantive difficulties for one
or more delegation’: Christian values in the preamble, the definition of qualified
majority voting (QMV) in the Council, the scope of QMV, and the minimum
threshold of European Parliament (EP) seats. Notably, whereas the latter three
issues could well be regarded as make-or-break issues for one or more member
states, the inclusion of Christian values on the list seemed above all motivated by
the Italians’ own preferences. Furthermore, the Presidency identified three issues
‘which are not in principle called into question, but on which some further clar-
ification is required in order to allow them to be applied in practice’: the rotating
presidency of Council formations, the Foreign Minister, and the modalities of
the European security and defence policy (ESDP).
The Presidency adopted a very restrictive stance towards allowing any new
issues to be added. As Foreign Minister Frattini put it:
We will adopt a ‘constructive dissent’ approach and not an amendatory one
that, in fact, would just become a ‘shopping list’ of individual Member
B. Crum: Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC 1213
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requests. In practice, an issue will be discussed only if a counterproposal is
presented and its ameliorative effect explained. The Italian Presidency will
oppose steps backward to reopen institutional pillars.
(Italian Presidency 2003)
Thus the Italians’ ambition to conclude the IGC as soon as possible led them to
seal the IGC agenda in an almost extreme way. Most notably, the Presidency
declined to reopen the issue of the composition of the European Commission,
much to the dismay of many small and medium-sized member states that feared
that the Convention’s proposal would disadvantage them relative to the bigger
member states. As the subsequent negotiations would show, most member states
still had a number of other issues that they would like to see reconsidered.
To a large extent the Italian handling of the IGC in the subsequent months
can be reconstructed as a backward struggle in which, one by one, new issues
were allowed on the IGC agenda. Already by the official start of the negotiations
in October, the Presidency had succumbed to allowing the composition of the
Commission on the agenda as well as the revision clause of the Constitutional
Treaty. Soon thereafter the Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council
had Italian Finance Minister Tremonti submit a list to his cabinet colleagues
involving amendments to the Convention’s proposals on issues like the
Union’s budget and the Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, an inventory
by the Presidency yielded a list of 91 ‘non-institutional issues’ (CIG 37/03) and
about 15–20 areas in which one party or another would like the voting
procedure (QMV or unanimity) to be reviewed (CIG 38/03).1
By the eve of the December summit, the Italians’ original agenda of four key
issues had been extended with another 43 issues plus 11 minor (‘miscellaneous’)
ones (CIG 60/03 ADD 1). As it turned out, the Italian Presidency was unable to
broker a deal that could meet with the agreement of all member states. Most
importantly, no reconciliation was found on the definition of QMV, as Spain
and Poland insisted on some form of weighted voting as included in the
Treaty of Nice. However, it was not just these member states that were intransi-
gent. Much goes to suggest that the failure of the December summit was a direct
reaction to the time pressure that had been at the basis of the Italian strategy (cf.
Ludlow 2004; Der Standard 2003). Concluding the negotiations in December
came for most delegations as ‘too much too soon’. Many small and medium-
sized states had resisted the Italian time pressure from the start. The Italians’
reluctance to adopt issues on the IGC agenda had fuelled their resentment.
Moreover, as the list of amendments had rapidly expanded in the final weeks,
many of the compromises were still fresh and not fully thought through.
The Irish agenda management strategy
After the failure of the December summit, the incoming Irish Presidency
adopted a very cautious approach. The Irish decided to suspend the (plenary)
negotiations and to use the two and a half months before the spring European
1214 Journal of European Public Policy
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Council as a ‘cooling down period’. Indeed, Prime Minister Ahern diagnosed
the failure of the December summit as an issue of atmosphere:
The assessment was that the European Council was trying to do too much,
too fast and it required to think out the issues more fully . . . If I, at any
time in the next number of months, believe the atmosphere will present
itself to finalize it, I’d take it. [But] that atmosphere is not there [now].
(cited by Handyside 2003)
In hindsight much of the Irish Presidency’s approach can be seen as an effort to
create a favourable kind of atmosphere. The IGC was only formally reconvened
by mid-May once the Presidency was confident that it would be able to conclude
the negotiations.
The Irish handling of the IGC’s agenda built upon the agenda as it had been
shaped under its Italian predecessor. Yet, being committed to meeting the
wishes of the national delegations, the Irish were not ruling any issues out of
order. As they insisted that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ (CIG
70/04: 3), issues could in principle be put on the agenda as long as the nego-
tiations were not yet concluded. Still, the work done by the Italians was taken
as having delineated the agenda and thus it was up to the delegations to demon-
strate that there were good reasons to add an issue or that the Italians had unduly
kept their concerns off the agenda.
In the end, little more than 15 new issues appeared on the IGC’s agenda
under the Irish Presidency and these were mostly of a secondary, technical
nature. Building on the legacy of the Italians, the Irish resolved most of the
issues concerning competences and the scope of QMV in April and May.
Most work eventually focused on the three issues that had already been
crucial at the December summit: the composition of the Commission, the
minimum number of seats in the EP and, above all, the definition of QMV.
Manoeuvring carefully, addressing each of these issues in turn and making
extensive use of informal (bilateral) meetings, the Irish inched forward on a
compromise on each of them. As the basic compromises gradually emerged,
their final details were successfully settled at the June summit.
Was the IGC bound to deal with the issues that it eventually did? Or would the
Constitutional Treaty have looked substantially different with other
Presidencies adopting a different agenda management strategy? With the draft
Constitutional Treaty of the Convention, the Italian Presidency basically
faced an unprecedented situation. Practical considerations would probably
have discouraged any state in the Presidency from reverting to the unwieldy
Treaty of Nice as the basis of the negotiations. Still, some member states
holding particular grudges against the Convention’s proposals (most notably
Spain and Poland on the redefinition of QMV) might have been tempted to
use this option as a threat to coerce some concessions from the start. Similarly,
the Italians’ choice of a restrictive agenda strategy seems to be the natural one for
B. Crum: Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC 1215
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any Presidency interested in a swift conclusion of the negotiations. Still, few
other Presidencies would probably have attached as much prestige to this as
the Italians. Furthermore, most member states had considerably more reser-
vations on the Convention’s draft. Apart maybe from the other five founding
member states, no state could have been expected to insist on a ‘progressive
stance’ that required the level of ambition of the Convention’s draft to be main-
tained. For the same reasons, other member states would probably have allowed
for a larger IGC agenda from the start and would, by implication, also have
adopted a more lenient attitude towards the addition of further issues.
Arguably, the Italians overdid their very strict agenda management strategy,
with the consequence that it eventually backfired at the December summit in
that it cost them the confidence of some states. Still, the failure to conclude
the IGC should not distract from the results that the Italians did achieve.
They firmly established the Convention’s draft as the basis of negotiations.
Obviously their attempt to contain the IGC’s agenda was compromised, but
access to the agenda remained strictly controlled and the total number of
issues remained within manageable proportions. The failure to realize the
initial ambition to conclude the IGC within its term in the Presidency may
well have been the unavoidable price to pay. In any case, it is hard to see how
a more hospitable agenda strategy would have secured a successful conclusion
of the negotiations in December.
The big achievement of the Irish Presidency was its ability to change the
atmosphere of the negotiations. It handled the cooling-down period very
well, and even resisted accelerating and formalizing the negotiations once it
had regained confidence at the spring European Council. Possibly another strat-
egy would also have led to completion of the negotiations, but the Irish success
in bringing the negotiations to an end is hard to beat. However, it is question-
able whether, negotiation breakdowns apart, the outcome could have looked
much different in substantive terms. Indeed as far as the IGC agenda was con-
cerned, the Irish Presidency basically had its work cut out for it and enjoyed
much less room for discretion than the Italians at the beginning of the negotiations.
Thus, much suggests that it was above all the Italian strategy that was instru-
mental in preserving most of the Convention’s draft. Few, if any, other member
states could have been expected to adopt a similarly restrictive approach. Other
Presidencies would most likely have allowed a longer and more substantive
agenda to develop with the consequence of the Convention’s draft being re-
negotiated to a much greater extent (and possibly a much longer IGC). The
Irish ability to conclude the negotiations thus owed a great deal to the restrictive
strategy of its Italian predecessor.
3. BROKERAGE: FINDING EFFICIENT SOLUTIONS
As indicated in section 1, the self-clearing thesis also implies that the Presidency
will have little leverage over distributing the benefits from co-operative arrange-
ments. Instead liberal intergovernmentalism argues that the benefits will be
1216 Journal of European Public Policy
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apportioned to the member states with the strongest reservations to the
proposed agreements and the biggest stakes in maintaining the status quo
(Moravcsik 1998: 60ff.). Reservations to the Convention’s draft basically
came in three kinds. First, some member states had concerns about specific
extensions of the Union’s competences or about the extension of QMV in
certain domains. This kind of reservation probably found its most extensive
expression in the position of the British government which defined a resolute
set of ‘red lines’ in its White Paper on the IGC, most notably against extension
of Union competences or majority voting in issues relating to economic govern-
ance, social policy, tax, the Union’s own resources, criminal justice and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Foreign Office 2003). Actually,
in many of these areas the British government was anything but on its own. But
few countries maintained a list of comparable length.
A second kind of reservation was held by most of the small and medium-sized
member states, which feared that the large member states would come to dom-
inate the European institutions. During the Convention these states had dedi-
cated much effort to opposing the proposal of a permanent European
Council President (cf. Magnette and Nicolaı¨dis 2005). While they grudgingly
came to accept the Convention’s compromise that limited the President’s
powers, their main preoccupation in the IGC was to ensure equal access of all
member states (regardless of size) to the European Commission, even if its
size was to be reduced below the total number of member states. Furthermore,
especially among the smaller member states, there was strong opposition against
the reduction of the minimum number of seats in the EP, which the Convention
had put at four.
The fiercest resistance to the Convention’s draft came from Spain and
Poland. These two countries were unwilling to accept the Convention’s propo-
sal to have the qualified majority required for decision-making in the Council
defined as a ‘double-majority’ involving ‘the majority of member states, repre-
senting at least three fifths of the population of the Union’. Such a redefinition
would undo the relatively large voting share that these two countries had secured
in the Treaty of Nice.
Scope of EU competences and QMV
With regard to the British and others’ sensitivities in competences and QMV,
much work had already been done under the Italian Presidency. Here it was
crucial that the Italians emphatically premised the negotiations on the basis of
the Convention’s draft rather than on the status quo established by the
Treaty of Nice. Furthermore, rather than simply yielding to any objections,
the Presidency sought to accommodate them on a step-by-step basis, putting
forward carefully calibrated competence redefinitions that sought to meet the
member states’ concerns while leaving the Convention’s intentions as much
as possible intact. Typically, in the fields of social security and criminal policy
the Presidency proposed a ‘safety mechanism’ that would allow a member
B. Crum: Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC 1217
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
17
:2
7 
30
 M
ay
 2
01
1
state to suspend the legislative procedure in the Council and put the issue before
the European Council.
The Irish handling of these issues contrasts nicely with that of the Italians,
even if by the time they came to the helm the main sensitivities had thus
already been accommodated. With some distinct reservations of their own,
the Irish yielded to a number of additional demands that the Italians had
resisted, like the Scandinavian wish to reintroduce unanimity in the common
commercial policy with regard to social, educational and health services. Also,
typically, whereas the Italian Presidency had only proposed some minor adjust-
ments to the Union’s competence in tax, the Irish Presidency eventually allowed
most of the relevant provisions to be scrapped altogether (CIG 81/04).
Composition of the Commission and the European Parliament
As we have seen, the Italian Presidency was very reluctant to allow the concerns
of the small and medium-sized member states about the composition of the
Commission and the EP on the IGC’s agenda. Even when these issues formally
entered the agenda, the Presidency refrained from submitting any concrete pro-
posals. The most it did was to signal the possibilities of postponing the introduc-
tion of the reduced Commission from 2009 to 2014 and of a ‘limited increase’
in the Convention’s threshold of four EP seats for the smallest states (CIG 60/
03). Possibly, the Italians genuinely failed to recognize any amendment as an
ameliorative alternative. Yet, another reason not to commit to any proposals
was that these issues might be used in a package deal to placate Spain and
Poland on the definition of QMV.
In its turn, the Irish Presidency decided to eschew any package deal and to
address all issues individually. On the EP, the Irish Presidency basically took
up the Italian suggestion of a small increase in the minimum number of seats
which was eventually put at six (CIG 83/04: 10). As a consequence the
maximum number of seats in the EP had to be raised from 736 to 750.
However, to limit the upward pressure on the size of the EP, the provision
was added that ‘No member state shall be allocated more than ninety-six
seats’ (cf. the current share of Germany of 99 in an EP of 732 seats).
With regard to the Commission, the central challenge was to satisfy those
(smaller) member states who resented the loss of a permanent Commissioner
of their own nationality and still to allow for a reduction of the size of the
College in due course (as was also already envisaged by the Treaty of Nice).
The solution came in a number of components. First, there was the postpone-
ment, already suggested by the Italians, of the reduced Commission from 2009
to 2014. Second, the Irish scrapped the special category of non-voting (junior)
Commissioners introduced by the Convention, as this distinction caused more
confusion than that it contributed to a solution. Then, third, the key to
the eventual solution was the Irish proposal to slightly raise the size of the
College beyond the 15 members as proposed by the Convention. While
the Irish initially suggested setting the number of Commissioners at 18, in
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the final hours of the negotiations this was amended to ‘two thirds of the
number of the member states’ but with the addition that this figure may be
revised by the European Council acting unanimously (CIG 84/04).
QMV definition
As was clear from the start of the negotiations, the (re-)definition of QMV
would be the most difficult issue to resolve. In essence the clash on this issue
was between Spain and Poland wanting some form of weighted voting a` la
Nice to be maintained and Germany and France insisting on the double-
majority formula put forward by the Convention. Even without the Italian insis-
tence on the Convention’s draft, it was clear that the pressure was on Spain and
Poland. Not only were their opponents the largest member states, they were also
the two states that could claim historically to have been at the heart of the
Union. Moreover, there were few signs that any other state was willing to
defend the Nice formula, if only for its dramatic opacity.
The Italian Presidency kept its cards to its chest on this issue. In the weeks
leading up to the December summit, options had been circulating in which
Spain and Poland might be persuaded to a double-majority formula with an
increase in the population threshold (from 60 per cent to 64 per cent, 66 per
cent or even 70 per cent) and with side payments in the form of a second Com-
missioner or additional seats in the EP (cf. Bouilhet 2003; Yarnoz 2003).
However, notwithstanding Prime Minister Berlusconi’s claim that he kept a sol-
ution up his sleeve (Tibuzzi 2003), it appears that by the time of the summit the
Italians not only had no hunch about the shape of a possible compromise but
were even without any clear perspective on how to proceed (cf. Ludlow 2004).
The Irish job may have been eased by the fact that the two firmest opponents
of the Convention’s proposal on this issue (Spanish Prime Minister Aznar and
Polish Prime Minister Miller) resigned from office in the spring. Still, the
impact of these political changes should not be overrated, as these changes in
personnel did not affect each country’s interest to secure as large a share as poss-
ible in the Council. The basis of the negotiations was always some form of
double-majority formula building upon the Convention’s proposal to define
the qualified majority as 50 per cent of the member states representing at
least 60 per cent of the Union’s population. To accommodate Spain and
Poland, it was proposed to raise the population key to 65 per cent, which
was of particular value to them as it would allow them to form a blocking min-
ority by coalescing with Germany and a third large country. However, as various
small and medium-sized member states insisted on a balance between the share
of states and the share of population, the Irish Presidency saw itself forced also to
increase the member states’ key from 50 per cent to 55 per cent.2 However, to
balance out the effects for small states and to prevent blocking minorities from
emerging too easily, it added that a blocking minority would need to involve at
least four member states (CIG 82/04: 2).
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Still, something more was needed than the mere recalibration of the percen-
tages to bring Spain and Poland on board. The additional safeguard was found
by harking back to the ‘Ioannina compromise’ of 1994. This compromise pro-
vides that if a proposal is opposed by a minority of member states marginally
smaller than the minority required for blocking a decision under QMV, the
states will do everything reasonably within their powers to find a solution
that is acceptable to all (cf. CIG 82/04: 3). The Irish Presidency started floating
this option in the course of the spring negotiations and tested it in bilateral con-
tacts with the key states involved. One important condition that was added was
that from 2014 onwards the Council might decide to repeal the Ioannina
formula. The complete amendment package proposal on the QMV definition
was only revealed at the June summit (CIG 83/04). There it still underwent
some final fine-tuning (adding a minimum of 15 states for QMV and recalibrat-
ing the threshold for activating the Ioannina formula), but was eventually
accepted without much further ado.
Did the Presidencies have any discretion in brokering unanimity on the
Constitutional Treaty? Or did the negotiations simply follow a straightforward
logic towards the lowest common denominator with those most resilient being
compensated most? The most notable finding in this section is that the estab-
lishment of the Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty as negotiation text
dramatically affected the fallback positions to which parties could appeal,
even if formally these were still constituted by the provisions under the
Treaty of Nice. Thus the agenda-management strategy adopted by the
Italian Presidency led the negotiations away from their lowest common
denominator logic and towards one in which compromises were constructed
on the basis of the Convention draft.
Notably, Spain and Poland, having the gravest reservations about the agree-
ment, received little in terms of compensation. Rather than receiving substantial
side-payments, the two countries seem to have been bullied into accepting the
double-majority formula. While the Irish Presidency seems to have identified
those formulas that went farthest in softening the double-majority formula, it
is hard to see them as genuinely compensating Spain and Poland.
With regard to the positions of the small and medium-sized states the assess-
ment is somewhat mixed. While for a long time they seemed rather marginal to
the whole negotiation process, eventually they had their way on the minimum
number of EP seats, which came at a significant price for Germany (and other
large member states) as the maximum number of seats was capped. On the
Commission a very carefully calibrated compromise was reached. Again,
however, while these concessions may have stretched the original proposal as
far as possible, the small and medium-sized states never reached the point
where they could reinstate the principle of one Commissioner per member
state or claim substantial compensations. A further indication of their limited
blocking power is that these same states had already shelved their opposition
to the European Council President even before the negotiations had properly
started.
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Also for the member states whose reservations concentrated on the issues of
scope of competences and QMV, it is hard to maintain that the veto threat
brought them major concessions. The Italians’ insistence on taking the Conven-
tion’s draft as the basis of the negotiations meant that any attempts to roll back
EU competences and QMV had to be conquered inch by inch. Here there is a
notable contrast with the Irish, who seemed more open to simply conceding to
any objections of this kind. They were, however, reluctant to renegotiate any
compromises that had already been forged by the Italians.
The limited success of those countries opposing the proposed changes on the
definition of QMV and on the Commission contradicts the liberal intergovern-
mentalist position which suggests a far greater potential to exploit the threat of a
veto. This contradiction is explained by the presence of the Convention draft.
Once the Italian Presidency succeeded in getting this draft accepted as the
basis of the negotiations, the political costs for member states (both internation-
ally as well as domestically) of actually exercising a veto became much higher.
Arguably, this applied less to the British government which was successful in
sustaining most of its ‘red lines’. Given its size, its role in the Union and its dom-
estic constituency, a British threat to veto might have had a greater credibility
than that of Spain, Poland or any smaller member state. Still, the British
concerns (or at least the ones they upheld after the Convention) were for
many of secondary importance and allowed quite well for limited concessions.
4. INTEREST PROMOTION: DETERMINING THE
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
Neither the Italian nor the Irish government had acted as a major driver of the
Convention’s work. The Italian government played a relatively low-key role in
the debates on the future of the EU, which reflected the various contradictory
inclinations within the government (cf. Fabbrini 2004). Still, as the Convention
went along, the Italian members more and more came out on the ‘federalist’
side. With the Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty emerging as a rather
ambitious, ‘federalizing’ text, the Italian government, along with the other
founding member states, came to support its preservation. Here of course
its substantial orientation very much coincided with its interest in making its
Presidency a success and claiming the credit for the historical agreement on
the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, at times it appeared as if the Italians’
embrace of the Convention’s draft was in fact inspired by its instrumental
role in making the Presidency a success.
That is not to say that the Italians had no wishes left with regard to the Con-
stitutional Treaty. On some points the Italian government would have preferred
an even more federalizing approach. Thus, during the Convention, its govern-
ment representative Gianfranco Fini had advocated keeping the phrase ‘an ever
closer Union’ in the Constitutional Treaty’s Preamble. Another issue on which
the Italians were keen to move further was the introduction of QMV in the
Union’s CFSP. Finally, the Italian government was among those who wanted
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a stronger reference in the Constitutional Treaty to the Judaic-Christian tra-
dition as underlying Europe’s shared values.
Compared to the Italians, the Irish government was far less attached to the
aspirations underlying the draft Constitutional Treaty. Especially after the trau-
matic experience with the referenda on the Treaty of Nice, the Irish stance on
integration, although basically rather positive, was marked by a number of reser-
vations in specific policy domains: ESDP, taxation, social security, justice and
home affairs (cf. Laffan 2003: 13–14). The Irish government representative
in the Convention, Dick Roche, had been sceptical of inserting any all too
grand, too federalizing, language in the Constitutional Treaty. Together with
other representatives from smaller member states, Roche staunchly opposed
the proposal of a permanent European Council President and was keen to
ensure absolute equal representation of all member states in the College of
Commissioners. Further, the Irish were critical of further integration in socio-
economic policy fields such as social policy or taxation. Given their status as a
non-aligned state, the Irish also had a distinctive interest in the ESDP. More-
over, the Irish were reluctant to delegate any new powers to supranational insti-
tutions, such as the Commission or agencies like Europol and Eurojust, or to
extend the powers of judicial oversight through a strong entrenchment of the
EU Charter of Rights or the extension of the powers of the European Court
of Justice. One final point of note is that the Irish were also among the
member states who advocated an explicit reference to Europe’s ‘Christian heri-
tage’ in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty.
One may regard the Italians’ success in establishing the Convention’s draft as
the basis of the negotiations as their main achievement in terms of self-interest
promotion. Arguably, the Italian Presidency also used its very restrained agenda
management and its insistence on ‘progressive solutions’ to keep certain issues
low on the agenda, like the composition of the Commission and the EP and
various issues that had been raised by the Ecofin Council. However, regardless
of the Italians’ broader achievements in restraining the IGC’s agenda, on these
specific policy preferences they eventually had to give way or to allow the Irish to
do so. Also with regard to their own pet issues the Italians were distinctively
unsuccessful in securing their preferences. While they boldly put the Preamble
at the top of the IGC’s agenda, they never came close to getting an explicit refer-
ence to Europe’s ‘Christian heritage’ in. The other bold proposal that they made
during their Presidency was to extend the use of QMV in the Union’s foreign
policy. However, this proposal was quickly removed by the Irish and was
unlikely to survive any IGC, given the outspoken objections of the UK and
other states.3
In turn, the Irish, notwithstanding their own Catholic inclinations, quickly
decided to remove the issue of the Preamble from the centre of the nego-
tiations. Similarly, while the Irish had in the past been among those advocat-
ing one Commissioner per member state, they refrained from promoting this
idea in the IGC. The sensitivities surrounding the ESDP and its possible
impingement on Irish neutrality were already resolved under the Italian
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Presidency with close involvement of the Irish and other non-aligned EU
member states.
Still, the Irish Presidency has a better claim to having brought specific provisions
in line with its own interests, even though these involve mostly points of secondary
importance. The 15 issues that only appeared on the IGC’s agenda after the Irish Pre-
sidency took over included some items congenial to the Irish interests in limiting EU
competences and the scope of QMV. Thus the Irish Presidency can be suspected of
having been quite welcoming to the (‘regressive’) changes it got adopted in the fields
of justice and home affairs (e.g. the amendments on Eurojust), economic policy (e.g.
the insertion of price stability in the objectives of the Union and changes in the for-
mulation of the Union’s role in the co-ordination of economic policy), tax (the scrap-
ping of the relevant provisions) and foreign policy (e.g. the role of the European
Court of Justice in CFSP). Many of the Irish reservations coincided with the
UK’s ‘red lines’. In practice then, rather than openly pressing their own concerns,
the Irish could to a considerable extent hide behind the British position.
5. CONCLUSION
Considering the Presidencies’ efforts in brokerage and (self-)interest promotion,
the 2003–04 IGC negotiations lend much support to the self-clearing thesis put
forward by the liberal intergovernmentalist theory of inter-state bargaining.
While the IGC Presidencies may have facilitated the successful conclusion of
the negotiations, it is not directly apparent that they have put their mark on
the substance of the outcome. For one, the eventual compromises on the
grand deals involving the EU institutions – the EP, the Commission, and,
above all, the definition of QMV – very much reflect the underlying structure
of member state interests. The main outlines of the proposals as favoured by
most member states were preserved. The remaining negotiations were about
defining the concessions that would placate reluctant members.
The Irish Presidency deserves the credit for having formulated these conces-
sions in their concrete details, but it is very hard to see how a Presidency could
have tackled the issues involved by way of a substantially different approach.
This evaluation is reinforced by the fact that in the great majority of the 73
amendments to the Convention’s text, the two Presidencies basically stuck to
the same approach. What is more, apart from some minor points where the
Irish could hide behind the back of the British, neither of the Presidencies suc-
ceeded in skewing the negotiations significantly in favour of their own interests.
Thus the diversity among member state preferences and the demand for unani-
mity severely limited the room for the Presidency to come to any other solutions
beyond the ones that were eventually established.
However, such an account looks mostly at the Presidencies’ efforts in broker-
age and interest promotion and plays down the preceding task of agenda man-
agement which had to take account of the presence of the draft Constitutional
Treaty prepared by the European Convention. This unprecedented situation left
it to the Presidency in office to navigate the void between the formal status quo
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under the Treaty of Nice and the Convention’s draft. Put in this position, the
Italian Presidency opted for an extreme approach combining an insistence on
the draft Constitutional Treaty with a very restrictive agenda management strat-
egy. Counterfactually, few, if any, other member states would have combined
such a lack of reservations over the draft Constitutional Treaty with such a
pride in seeking to conclude the IGC within the term of the Presidency.
Instead they probably would have taken a less ambitious and more lenient
approach towards the IGC’s time-frame and agenda.
Against (newspaper) accounts that have highlighted the dramatic failure of
the December European Council, this article vindicates the Italian Presidency
of the 2003–04 IGC. By adopting the agenda management strategy that it
did, the Italian Presidency left its mark not only on the process of the nego-
tiations but also on the substantial outcomes that eventually came about.
With respect to the process, the Italians may have made a mistake in claiming
that the IGC would be concluded within their term of Presidency. Yet, in a
deeper sense, they may have been right in imposing that much pressure on
the negotiations. Indeed, it is questionable whether with a less stringent
opening leadership strategy, any successive Presidency would have concluded
the IGC and would have secured so much of the Convention’s draft.
What is more, if the Irish Presidency turned out to be the perfect midwife, the
Italian Presidency left a marked imprint on the substance of the Constitutional
Treaty. Its agenda management strategy salvaged more of the Convention’s draft
from the negotiations than would have otherwise been the case. Moreover, the
establishment of the Convention’s draft as the basis of the negotiations had the
twin consequences of removing the Treaty of Nice status quo from the purview
of the negotiations and raising the political costs for member states of actually
exercising a veto. As was demonstrated in section 3, with the background
against which deals had to be brokered thus changed, recalcitrant states failed
to extract substantial side-payments and only saw the impact of the proposed
changes softened by limited concessions.
The Convention’s work allowed the EU Presidency to adopt an agenda man-
agement strategy that changed the nature of the negotiations and the power con-
figuration of interests, which thus radically departed from those normally
applying at IGCs. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that IGCs in the future will
allow for a similar logic. Member states can be expected to be reluctant to a Con-
vention hijacking their agenda. This reluctance has, moreover, been reinforced as
they have found that the result to which they eventually signed up met with broad
opposition among their constituencies in the subsequent ratification process.
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Notes
1 All official IGC documents are indicated by their official CIG number. They are
available online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/Appli-
cations/igc/doc_register.asp?content¼DOC&lang¼EN&cmsid¼900.
2 This follows the basic logic that the blocking power of small states increases the
higher the required proportion of states is set, while an increase of the proportion
of the population works mainly to the advantage of the more populated states.
3 This proposal did not survive the negotiations. It only leaves its trace in Annex 30 of
CIG 81/04 that basically reproduces the original Convention text.
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